ECG-CFS conference on Financial System Modernisation in Berlin, as well as the Executive Compensation Workshop in Stirling for their many useful comments.
Introduction
Issues surrounding executive compensation have taken on increased prominence in recent times. A particular concern has been the climb in executive pay relative to national average salaries. For example, a report by the Internal Revenue Service indicates that between 1980 and 1995, total pay of CEOs rose by about $200 billion, an increase of 182% on an inflation-adjusted basis. During this same period corporate profits rose by only 127%, and wages of non-supervisory employees actually fell slightly. 1 
Mishel,
Bernstein, and Allegretto (2005) note that the average CEO compensation soared 342% between 1989 and 2000 and that CEOs in 2003 were paid 185 times as much as the average worker while the corresponding ratio was only 26 in 1965. Indeed, the ballooning of executive compensation has been difficult to explain using traditional frameworks that involve arguments based on "market discipline," i.e., those based on effective governance by boards of directors elected by astute shareholders.
Academics have focused considerable attention toward understanding compensation, particularly since the work of Jensen and Murphy (1990) . Specifically, much research (e.g., Aggarwal and Samwick, 1990 , Barro and Barro, 1990 , and Kaplan, 1994 has focused on pay-for-performance sensitivities across different companies. The lack of transparency about executive compensation packages combined with the steep rise in relative levels of compensation over recent decades, however, warrants a separate investigation.
A recent article in the New York Times highlighted the case of Analog Devices where deferred CEO compensation was not disclosed for a number of years.
2 Also in the spotlight has been the apparent delinkage of compensation with financial performance. 3 Spurred by these concerns, the SEC has recently mandated clearer disclosure of executive compensation.
These issues surrounding compensation of top management are not insignificant. For example, Bebchuk and Fried (2003) indicate that the pay of the top five best-paid U.S.
executives amounts to as much as 10% of their company's profits. Bebchuk and Grinstein (2005) suggest that the dramatic growth of non-equity compensation in the 1990s has not been matched by a corresponding decrease in equity-based compensation. In a wellfunctioning capital market where market oriented governance mechanisms (i.e., boards representing shareholders) are supposed to limit excesses, how can the increasing trend in executive compensation both in absolute terms and in relation to average employee compensation be rationalized?
In this paper, we address the preceding question with a novel approach that relates stylized facts on executive compensation to another seemingly disparate set of stylized facts, namely, that trading volume has also increased dramatically over time, as has individual investor access to markets. Chordia, Huh, and Subrahmanyam (2007) report that turnover increased by 500% over the 1980 to 2002 period, and average bid-ask spreads have declined steeply in recent years (Jones, 2002) . At the same time, technologies like the advent of online trading, as well as secular regulatory events such as the lowering of the tick size, have increased access to the financial markets. 4 It is possible that cheaper access to markets and the corresponding increase in trading activity are connected to the trend in executive compensation. One way in which this may occur is via the degree of sophistication of the investing clientele in a company. In other words, the lower trading costs documented in Jones (2002) , among others, may attract more trading by small investors who appear content to trade in financial markets where, on average, they lose money (see, for example, Kumar, 2006) . 5 Indeed, from 1992 -2001, average total annual 4 Heaton and Lucas (1999) document the sharp increase in the number of shareholders in U.S. stocks during the 1990s.
5 Small investor losses from trading may result from cognitive limitations or outside activities that create high opportunity costs of learning about financial markets as well as accounting rules and conventions. See, for example, Benartzi and Thaler (2001) , Lo, Repin, and Steenbarger (2005) , or Hong, Stein, and Yu (2007) for evidence regarding investor naïveté about financial markets. More generally, for evidence that agents often have naïve notions about complex issues (such as scientific inquiry or the intricacies of scientific subjects such as physics), see Reif (1995) .
"small" trade dollar volume has increased by about 437%, 6 partly due to the advent of new technologies for online trading (Barber and Odean, 2002 ). It seems reasonable, then, to argue that shifts in executive compensation may be related to the variations in the sophistication of investors.
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We build on the preceding idea by developing a simple model that links managerial compensation to the clientele that holds a firm's stock. The starting point for the framework is that managerial attempts to negotiate their compensation are linked to the ability of outside shareholders to monitor wages and total compensation (viz. Burkart, Gromb, and Panunzi, 1997 , Hartzell and Starks, 2003 , and Efendi, Srivastava, and Swanson, 2007 . 8 In turn, monitoring skill is related to the sophistication of the firm's investing clientele, which, in our model is governed by the incentives of individual investors to participate in the market for the firm's securities.
Based on Odean (1998 Odean ( , 1999 and Kumar (2006) who provide evidence that, on average, individuals trading stock lose money, it appears reasonable to postulate that these agents derive direct utility from trading. 9 Therefore, key factors in the decision of an individual investor to participate in financial markets are his monetary-equivalent utility from trading, the illiquidity cost he expects to incur by losing money on average to more sophisticated traders, and the ex ante costs of entry. 10 We further suppose that, unlike 6 Following Barclay and Warner (1993) who classify orders less than 500 shares as "small", in the empirical analysis that follows, we measure small trade volume as the dollar volume from orders of 500 shares or less. Further evidence from the NYSE website indicates the increased participation of individual investors in recent years. For example, the share of orders within the size range 100-2,099 shares in total NYSE volume was as low as 12.7% in January 1989 but climbed to as high as 50.8% by December 2005.
7 Only active shareholders who present a credible threat to replace the board of directors can ensure that the board is objective in determining compensation.
8 Our work, unlike that of Bolton, Scheinkman, and Xiong (2006) , does not focus on the choice between short-term and long-term investment projects and their relation to investor clientele.
9 While it is possible that small investors are simply risk-loving, Kumar (2006) notes a subtle difference between those who are risk-seeking (speculators) and those who derive utility from undertaking risky investments (gamblers). In particular, risk-seeking speculators choose investments with higher risk but also higher expected returns. Gamblers, however, take large risks but are not rewarded with a commensurate expected return. In other words, gamblers may accept lower returns because they obtain some utility from gambling.
10 Such costs can be monetary (e.g., resources consumed in setting up a brokerage account) as well as sophisticated institutional traders who are effective at governance, individual investors are unable to fully decipher and monitor executive compensation. For example, naïve investors are unlikely to detect practices like spring-loading and backdating options (Lie, 2005 ) that essentially transfer wealth from shareholders to executives. Concealed arrangements, consisting of deferred compensation, post-retirement income guarantees, and stock option packages, are not only difficult to value but likely difficult to understand.
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The challenges faced by individual investors in properly deciphering compensation packages imply that, in equilibria where such agents find it worthwhile to trade, expected executive compensation is greater than otherwise. The model suggests that technological innovations that make it cheaper to trade stocks increase the tendency of individual investors to be more strongly represented in the shareholding clientele (perhaps because technological innovations make trading even more fun for these individuals) so managers will be more likely to successfully mask their compensation to outsiders and concomitantly increase their true compensation. 12 An increase in executive compensation may then simply be explained by a decrease in the sophistication of the clientele who trades a company's stock. 13 We also show that while an increase in the precision of private cognitive (e.g., the costs of learning about the stock market). 11 A press release dated July 6, 2006 from Reuters notes that more than 50 companies' option granting practices are being investigated. See also http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/infooptionsscore06-full.html for an updated list of companies currently under examination for options scandals. Other recent articles have focused on how details of compensation packages are difficult to decipher. Core, Guay, and Larker (2007) is one of many related studies that focuses on the role of media in bringing the levels and types of executive compensation to the attention of the public.
12 An alternative interpretation is that technologies that make it cheaper to trade lead to an increase in short-term investors (individuals or others) who are less concerned with carefully monitoring executive compensation than the "traditional" institution.
13 Gabaix and Landier (2006) explain the rise in executive compensation by linking it to a rise in market capitalization. In their model, top executives of larger firms are paid more simply because they span a larger asset base. This model, however, explains neither why pay appears to be delinked from performance Grinstein, 2005, Bebchuk, Fried, and Walker, 2002) , nor why there is an impetus to increase disclosure, presumably in response to efforts by management to hide true compensation (viz. Footnote 11). Some papers (e.g., Dow and Raposo, 2005) have attributed the rise in CEO pay to the greater incentives required due to increased uncertainty in recent times, but this argument has been challenged in a calibrated model by Gayle and Miller (2005) . In a recent paper, Hermalin (2005) argues that tighter corporate governance increases CEO pay because there is less job security, but again, the issues surrounding concealment of compensation are not addressed by this argument. Furthermore, the evidence suggests that lack of adequate corporate governance, rather than information held by sophisticated institutions decreases liquidity, it can keep executive compensation in check by deterring the entry of individual investors.
We test some empirical implications of our model using executive compensation data.
The time-series link between compensation and clientele shifts is inherently difficult to test owing to other factors that may affect both variables over time. Thus, we instead provide evidence that executive compensation is cross-sectionally linked to trading volume and, more specifically, that indirect executive compensation is positively related to small trade volume and return variance, and negatively related to institutional holdings. These results are consistent with the notion that highly volatile stocks (to which individuals are likely to be attracted (Kumar, 2006) ) as well as stocks with greater individual investor participation have greater levels of indirect compensation. Our conclusions survive a host of robustness checks, including procedures that address endogeneity, and different proxies for volume from small traders. This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a simple model of individuals and institutions dealing with management that puts forth opaque financial statements that effectively conceal the actual amount of resources available for compensation. Section 3 endogenizes the entry decision of individual investors. Section 4 provides results to empirical tests, and Section 5 concludes. Proofs appear in the appendix.
The Basic Model

The Economic Setting
We consider a simple model of a firm with assets that are dedicated to executive compensation and an uncorrelated ongoing project that generates a random cash flow F ≡F +δ, too much of it, is the issue (Bebchuk and Fried, 2004) . Another proposed explanation for the generally high levels of executive compensation is the tournament model of Rosen (1986) which suggests that CEO compensation may be seen as a "prize" for winning a within-firm tournament wherein participants accept low pay before the tournament begins in order to play in it. O'Reilly, Main, and Crystal (1988) , however, do not find support for this theory. In sum, it appears that there is room in the literature for understanding corporate governance from different viewpoints.
whereF is non-stochastic and positive, and δ is a normally distributed variable with zero mean. For now, we assume there is no trading in claims on F ; we relax this assumption in the next section. The minimum payment required to keep the manager employed in order to generate F is a number L. Thus, L can be construed to represent a reservation level of managerial compensation -without a minimum compensation of L, the manager quits and the firm ceases to exist. We assume that the manager's basic compensation level is fixed at L but that he has the opportunity to pay himself hidden compensation in addition to L.
There are two types of investors, "individuals" and "institutions." While we make this sharp distinction within the model, our aim is simply to distinguish between sophisticated investors who can decipher compensation packages from company disclosures and less sophisticated individuals who cannot.
14 The former class of agents is termed "institutions" but may also include financially trained and wealthy individuals. The latter class of investors includes relatively less "specialized" individual investors for whom the deciphering of disclosures is challenging. The lack of sophistication can arise from limited cognitive ability, or a relative lack of knowledge about accounting procedures and a high opportunity cost of learning about such rules and conventions. 15, 16 We suppose that there is a representative individual investor who, if present, holds a fraction β of the firm's shares; the remainder are held by the institutional investor.
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We model in a stylized fashion the outcomes on executive compensation that can obtain when different types of clientele hold shares in the company's stock. For brevity, 14 In our empirical analysis, we use trade-size to distinguish more sophisticated institutions from individuals; see Footnote 6. 15 Our supposition, as that of scholars in psychology such as Wechsler (1958) and Jensen (1998) , is that cognitive abilities vary in the cross-section of individuals; such differences can arise, for example, due to unequal access to quality education. We emphasize, however, that in no way should this paper be viewed as subscribing to the notion that there are inter-group differences in cognitive abilities.
16 One might question why unsophisticated individuals do not simply hold mutual funds. Based on prior literature (Kumar, 2006 , among others), we assume that individual investors derive some utility from trading, and will therefore trade as long as the sum of their expected profits from trading and the monetary-equivalent utility from trading exceeds entry costs.
17 The representative individual investor can be viewed as a coalition of outside investors. In Section 3.3, we consider the case of multiple outside investors.
however, we do not model in detail the specific process of governance, e.g., election of the board of directors by plurality or some other method.
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We denote the value of the assets used to pay compensation as W . We assume that there are two possible beliefs for W : H or L, with H > L. While the institution knows that the true value of W is H, an outside individual investor initially believes that W = L.
19 We allow for the possibility that the individual undertakes a costly investigation, following which he deciphers the true realization of W with a positive probability. For now, we take the individual's decision to investigate and his beliefs about W to be exogenous. We endogenize these in Subsection 2.3.
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Governance is controlled by the investing clientele through a board of directors (BOD).
In our framework, the role of the BOD is to simply offer responses to managerial dividend proposals on behalf of the investors. The proposal that comes into force is that made by the majority of the BOD. Each category of investor has a proportional share in the composition of the board and that share recommends responses by the category of investor it represents.
First, suppose that the institution is the only shareholder. In this case, we assume a fraction γ (γ < 0.5) of the BOD passively accepts the strategy proposed by the manager.
The remaining fraction acts on behalf of the institution by following the accept/reject strategies the institution proposes. When the individual is present, we seek to capture the phenomena resulting from the possibility of individuals having a majority say in the 19 Postulating a different initial prior for individuals complicates the analysis, but does not materially alter the intuition we seek to exposit. 20 We note here that our aim is to model a situation where managers can surreptitiously pay themselves extra compensation above their reservation wage if (unsophisticated) individual investors mistakenly believe that resources available for compensation are lower than the true level of such funds. This is captured by postulating the scenario that the institution knows that W = H while allowing for the possibility that individual investor beliefs are anchored at W = L. Note that in the case not considered in our model, namely where the institution correctly believes that W = L, it is trivial that no additional compensation beyond L is possible regardless of individual investor beliefs. Also, in the spirit of the models of Barberis, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) , Daniel, Hirshleifer, and Subrahmanyam (1998) , and Hong and Stein (1998) , in our model, individual investors do not have perfect foresight expectations.
governance of the firm, rather than institutions. The individual holds a fraction β of the shares and a proportion β of the BOD follows the accept/reject strategies proposed by the individual. A fraction γ of the institutional share of the board remains passive in this case. We also assume that the fraction of the institutional share of the BOD that is active, (1−γ)(1−β), is less than 0.5; i.e., the institution is not able to control managerial strategies in the presence of the individual investor. This assumption is intended to ensure that when the individual investor is present, the compensation outcome is the result of whether the individual finds it worthwhile to undertake costly investigation to ascertain the true value of W . 
Strategies
Managerial proposals involve the size of a dividend to be paid out of W (the payoff on the project F is automatically passed on to investors and is not discretionary). The two allowable levels of the dividend are zero and H − L. If the equilibrium dividend is non-zero, it is apportioned between individuals and institutions in proportion to their holdings. The manager's strategy space is to propose one of the two levels of dividend.
The investors' strategy space is to either accept the proposal or reject it and propose the other level of the dividend. For technical reasons, in order to break ties in strategy preferences, we assume that opposing a managerial proposal causes an investor to incur an arbitrarily small cost of > 0. We look for an equilibrium in pure strategies.
If the manager proposes a zero dividend and it passes unopposed, then the manager pays himself a hidden compensation of H − L. It is evident that a proposal of a dividend of H − L can only reduce the manager's compensation, therefore it is at least a weakly optimal strategy to propose a zero dividend. We therefore postulate that the manager always proposes a zero dividend. 21 We note that we do not claim that retail investors affect board composition; rather, our model is based on the possibility that greater retail investor participation simply changes the character of the (given) board. That is, an existing board member may become more passive as retail investor participation increases.
Consider first the equilibrium where the institution is the only shareholder. Recall that the institution knows the value of W to be H. Thus, if the institution is the only shareholder, its optimal strategy is to reject the zero-dividend proposal through the BOD and pay itself an immediate dividend of H − L. Thus, in equilibrium, the managerial proposal is rejected and the compensation is L.
When the individual investor is present, the governance question is whether the surplus H − L is paid as a dividend to the investors or covertly extorted by the manager as extra compensation. Recall that the individual investor is pivotal if he is present, so the institution's response to managerial proposals can be ignored in the presence of the individual. In cases where the individual either does not investigate or investigates and finds the true value to be L, a majority of the BOD accepts the manager's zero dividend proposal on the basis that there are no funds available to pay an immediate dividend (because opposition is costly, the manager's proposal passes unopposed in equilibrium).
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In this case, in equilibrium, the manager pays himself an extra compensation of H − L over L, i.e., a total compensation of H.
In the case where the individual investor investigates and assesses the value of W to be H, because the individual's optimal strategy is to reject the manager's proposal of a zero dividend, the investors capture the surplus through the BOD by way of an extra dividend of H − L.
For convenience, Table 1 summarizes the board's response to the managerial proposal of a zero dividend, as well as the ensuing compensation within the model. In the table, as well as in the remainder of the paper, we consider the limiting case of → 0 for convenience. The individual's entry decision is endogenized in the next section. 22 We assume that the investigation is done by the individual, and his response to the manager's proposed compensation and dividend is transmitted to the manager by way of the portion of the BOD attributed to him. An alternative interpretation is that the investigation is done by the individual's apportioned BOD, and the individual does not have the power to get rid of BODs who are not competent enough to decipher the true W . The analysis remains essentially unchanged under this alternative interpretation.
The Individual Investor's Decision to Investigate
We now consider the equilibrium investigation decision of the individual investor. At a cost of C I , the individual may investigate to ascertain the true value of W . If he does investigate, he concludes W = L with probability p and W = H with probability 1 − p. We assume that the probability p of the individual investor concluding W = L is a control variable for the manager. 23 We endogenize p by explicitly modeling a cost of obfuscating financial statements. We suppose that an external regulatory agency can investigate managerial disclosure after time 0 but prior to the release of the firm's true value at time 1. While the costs and benefits of the agency are not incorporated into the analysis, we suppose that if the manager is found to have masked the actual level of resources available for compensation (i.e., set a positive p), the penalty incurred is a positive quantity C r . The penalty captures the reputational and potentially monetary costs incurred by the manager after being discovered. 24 The probability the agency discovers misrepresentation by the manager is 0.5kp 2 , where k is a variable such that 0 < k < 1. The notion captured by this parameterization is that an overly disingenuous assessment is more likely to be uncovered than one that is somewhat less extreme.
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Thus, the expected cost of setting p is 0.5cp 2 , where c ≡ kC r . We note that the quantity cp 2 may also be construed as representing a psychic cost (that captures the inherent disinclination to be dishonest), as in Becker (1976) ; by way of this parameterization, the greater is p, the degree of obfuscation, the greater is the psychic cost. The costs of setting 23 In our setting, the manager has an incentive to understate W . Generally, managers are presumed to have an incentive to overstate total earnings in order to boost stock prices and thereby increase their compensation. While our mechanism does not allow for this type of misrepresentation, our analysis exemplifies the notion that misrepresentation can take various forms; for example, merely by showing low cash flow numbers but retaining the flexibility to issue options and deferred compensation packages, the manager can misrepresent the likely size of the eventual compensation package to the BOD. It would require the forecasting of future cash flow numbers to assess the extent to which such compensation would be possible, and managers would be able to manipulate beliefs about forecasts through disclosures such as annual reports.
24 The modeling of this behavior is closely related to the approach of Subrahmanyam (2005) . 25 The notion that the actual level of resources is not verifiable with complete certainty is in the spirit of costly state verification models of Townsend (1979) , Gale and Hellwig (1984) , Larker and Weinberg (1989) , Winton (1995) , and Crocker and Morgan (1998).
too high a p then have two interpretations: the first is that the manager's behavior is more likely to be discovered, and the second is that the psychic cost is greater.
Assuming the individual investor is present and that he investigates, the manager maximizes his net expected extra payoff,
Since H > L and c > 0, p is strictly positive. For p < 1, we need H − L < c, and we will assume that this condition holds. Furthermore, we will often treat p as a given parameter in the model, while implicitly recognizing its dependence on other parameters through (1). The expected compensation, assuming investigation, is L plus the expected extra compensation arising from concealing the true firm value. Denoting the mean compensation by E(W ), we then have
Now consider the individual investor's problem. Note that this agent will investigate if
where C I represents the cost of investigation to the individual investor. Thus, in equilibrium, there will be investigation so long as
which leads us to the following proposition.
Proposition 1 1. Ex ante expected executive compensation is lower when the individual investor is not present as a stockholder.
2. If the individual investor is present as a stockholder, expected executive compensation is higher when the individual investor does not investigate than when he does.
The above proposition proves our basic result that if relatively naïve individual investors are present in the market, managers are able to randomize on the variable that represents their true compensation and hence raise the ex ante expected compensation. 26 In the next section, we model the individual investor's entry into the financial market.
The Securities Market
To model the link between financial markets and compensation, we now extend the model to account for trading on the firm's securities. The claims traded are on the project that pays F =F + δ, and not on the assets used for compensation (i.e., L). This separation helps maintain tractability but is of no other material consequence for the purposes of our intuition. 
Endogenous Entry with a Single Individual Investor
We will assume a standard adverse selection model of market microstructure for trading claims on the project with a payoff of F . Private information is possessed by the single institutional investor who observes δ perfectly.
28 If the individual investor is present, the noise demand is contributed by this agent and totals z where z ∼ N (0, v z ). As usual, the price P set by a risk-neutral market marker is a linear function of the total order flow Q, 26 It may be worth considering if excessive compensation resulting from insufficient ability to decipher compensation packages can be addressed by takeovers by other companies or the removal of the CEO by large institutions. Such actions, however, are likely to be prohibitively costly. For example, the costs involved in mounting a takeover bid likely exceed the excess compensation of a few top executives. Further, removal of an entrenched CEO with a sympathetic board is potentially a difficult undertaking. See, for example, Fisman, Khurana, and Rhodes-Kropf (2005) , among others.
27 Similar assumptions are found in Ozdenoren and Yuan (2007) , and Subrahmanyam and Titman (2001) .
28 This information may be interpreted either as obtained from security analysis, or through "tips" from corporate insiders by way of social networks between institutions and wealthy corporate executives.
and takes the form P =F + ζQ.
29 If the individual investor does not participate in the market, then, in effect, there is no market because there is no liquidity or noise trading.
Assuming the individual investor participates (in the spirit of Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988 , Kyle 1985 , or Subrahmanyam, 1991 , the illiquidity parameter ζ in this market is given by
Note that the individual investor earns negative expected profits in our setting since he has no private information. This is consistent with the work of Kumar (2006) and Odean (1998 Odean ( , 1999 who indicate that individual investors seem to actively trade stocks even if they earn inferior returns. We thus assume that the individual investor directly derives utility from trading (as a consumption good) and that the monetary equivalent of this is K. In addition, we suppose a fixed cost C E has to be paid by the individual to enter the stock market. This can be interpreted as the setup costs associated with opening a brokerage account and cognitive costs involved in familiarizing oneself with the equity markets and the trading process.
It is well-known that in our setting (see, e.g., Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988) , the expected losses of the uninformed individual investor to the informed agents are ζv z .
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Also note that once the agent enters the market he has the option (but not the obligation) to investigate. These observations imply that the agent will enter into the market for the firm's stock if
where p is given by (1) . The conditions that encourage entry are a low C E , a high K, and a smaller standard deviation of information.
This leads us to the following proposition.
29 For convenience, we assume that unlimited short-sales are allowed. 30 To understand this, note that the losses are given by the negative of E[(F − P )z]. Substituting P =F + ζQ yields the relevant expression.
Proposition 2
1. The individual investor enters the market whenever the cost of entry and the variance of the cash flows (v δ ) is sufficiently low, and the monetary equivalent of utility from trading is sufficiently high.
2. Expected executive compensation, trading volume, and liquidity are higher when the individual investor enters the stock market than when he does not.
3. Given that the individual investor enters the stock market, expected executive compensation is greater when the agent does not investigate than when he does.
Within our setting, if the individual investor enters, he de facto obtains control of the firm's governance. This presents the problem that due to naïveté, the agent may not be able to decipher compensation packages accurately, which, in turn, precludes the agent from forcing the compensation down to L and therefore leads to increased executive compensation on average. Note that policies that reduce the cost of financial market access, i.e., the parameter C E , increase the parameter set under which the individual investor enters. Therefore expected executive compensation is greater when the cost of entry is lower. This argument suggests that easing access to financial markets by way of technologies such as online trading do create liquidity but have the possibly unintended consequence of introducing individual investors whose cognitive limitations or lack of sophistication allow managers to blur financial statements and thereby increase expected compensation. We now consider an interesting extension of our basic setting when the institution observes δ with some noise. We suppose that the information signal is δ + where 31 The role for financial markets in conveying information about investment choices is not present in our model. In other models, such as the one of Holmström and Tirole (1993) , information from stock prices may be used to monitor self-interested managers, forcing them to make the appropriate investment choices.
∼ N (0, v ) and is independent of all other random variables. The illiquidity parameter ζ is given by (see the appendix)
The above expression is decreasing in v . The equivalent of (5) now becomes
Proposition 3 An increase in the precision of private information reduces the parameter set under which the individual investor participates in the financial market and therefore tends to reduce expected executive compensation.
Basically, since the right-hand side becomes smaller as v (which is inversely related to signal precision) becomes larger, increasing the precision of information makes it less likely that the individual investor will enter. Thus, an increase in the precision of the private signal, that traditionally is supposed to hurt financial markets by increasing adverse selection, actually increases the likelihood that more sophisticated agents will be holding a firm's stock. This enables more effective control of executive compensation.
Therefore, a benefit of more accurate private information (either as inside information or by way of advance access to an analyst's signal -viz., Green, 2006) is that it allows for more successful managerial monitoring by deterring the entry of unsophisticated traders.
The Effect of Policies that Reduce Signal Precision
Suppose regulatory authorities can preclude the trading on certain types of precise signals (e.g., by way of prohibiting trading on material information). Would it necessarily be optimal to enforce such regulations? Of course, a full analysis of this question requires consideration of fairness in the form of equal access to information. Abstracting from considerations of this type, consider the following tradeoffs in the context of our model.
Increasing signal precision tends to deter the entry of individual investors. This allows for improved governance and thereby facilitates extra payments to shareholders while precluding extra executive compensation. Yet, it also reduces the liquidity of the financial market. Thus, the net effect is ambiguous.
To formalize the above notion consider that the regulatory authority seeks to maxi- 
This implies that the individual enters the financial market only when the signal noise variance is v G . In this scenario, one can state the following proposition.
Proposition 4 If v G is high enough and v S is low enough such that (8) holds, and if
then the optimal choice of the regulatory authority is the lower signal noise or higher signal precision represented by v S .
Thus, in cases where the weight placed on minimizing executive excess is large enough and the weight on liquidity is low enough, the optimal response of the regulatory authority indeed may be to allow trading on a signal with higher precision.
Many individual investors
We now extend our analysis to include many individual investors. For convenience, we use the model where the information about δ is perfect. The assumptions about the BOD share controlled by individuals as a group and the fraction of the BOD that is passive remain unchanged from the previous section. Suppose that there are I individual investors present in the stock market. Assume the noise demand is contributed to equally by each of the agents and thus totals Iz, where z ∼ N (0, v z ). This implies that the illiquidity parameter ζ is given by
We assume that the total number of individual investors is bounded above by M .
Each investor can investigate; the probability of any one investor concluding that W = L is p. Note that if J individuals investigate, the probability of any one investor uncovering the actual funds available is 1 − p J , i.e., one minus the probability of anyone discovering the same. For simplicity, we assume that if any one investor infers the true value of W (i.e., H), then this investor communicates with other investors and forms a coalition, which subsequently forces the payment of an extra dividend H − L. 33 Further, this facility is independent of the number of individual investors who trade in the financial market. If the compensation is indeed L, the dividend received by each individual investor is βI −1 (H − L). We also assume that if the I'th investor enters, all other agents who are not individual investors change their strategies in a consistent fashion in response to this move, and the investor takes this into account when choosing to enter (as in Admati and Pfleiderer, 1988) .
Under the preceding conditions, assuming I − 1 investors are already present, and J − 1 of those investigate, it follows from (3) that an I'th investor will enter if
33 More complicated communication rules are possible; for example, one could require a critical mass of investors to conclude that W = L before the compensation is forced to L. Modeling such rules, however, would detract from the central points we wish to make.
where the value of p (from a simple modification of (1)) is the J'th root of (H − L)/c. It can be seen from the above condition that if K −C E > 0, then, so long as M is sufficiently large, there will always exist an equilibrium where all M individual investors enter the market. If C I and std(δ) are large, however, there also may exist an equilibrium where none of the agents enter because illiquidity and investigation costs with just one investor may be too high to make it worthwhile for the first agent to enter.
An issue in the equilibrium where all M agents enter is that of how many choose to investigate. Note, however, that if the cost of investigation is lower than βM
(as will be the case, for example, when C I is zero), they all will investigate.
Rather than analyze several equilibria of this setting, for brevity we report the following proposition of interest:
Proposition 5 1. Assuming that K > C E , the equilibrium under which all individual investors enter exists as long as the maximum number of such investors is sufficiently large.
Expected executive compensation is higher in the equilibrium where all individual
investors enter the stock market than in that where no individual enters.
3. Given that all individual investors enter the stock market, expected executive compensation is smaller if they all investigate than when nobody does.
In general, when the population of individual investors is large, it will be more likely that they all enter for two reasons. First, their presence makes the market more liquid, which benefits them all. Second, the investors are more likely to discover the true compensation if there are more of them. The countervailing force is that when there are more individual investors, they receive less of the share of the surplus H − L generated when managerial manipulation is discovered. The basic result, that individual investors increase expected compensation, survives in this scenario as well.
Implications
To develop cross-sectional implications using the above analysis, we rely on the model as well as out-of-model arguments. We conjecture that managers of complex firms are more likely to conceal compensation than those of focused firms because individual investors are less able to decipher the complicated accounting statements of such firms with multiple lines of business. This implies that cases of obfuscated disclosures and covert compensation are more likely to arise in large firms than in small, concentrated firms. In formal terms, the parameter c (related to the probability of detection) is likely to be small for diversified firms. Thus, true compensation is likely to be more difficult to decipher for larger, more diverse, corporations. Closer investigation following increased transparency should reveal greater levels of hidden compensation for such companies (e.g., in the form of hard-to-detect deferments and retirement packages).
Another set of implications relates to how we expect the entry cost C E and the utility from trading K to vary across individual investors. One may presume that C E is inversely related to the sophistication of the individual investor. One proxy for sophistication is the wealth of the agent. While direct proxies for wealth may not be available, indirect evidence may be obtained by stock liquidity. Thus, more liquid stocks consist of more small noise traders with high entry costs. Our analysis predicts greater average compensation in more liquid stocks. Similarly, lottery-type stocks with high skewness and volatility (as defined by Kumar, 2006 ) may provide greater monetary-equivalent utility from trade (i.e., K may be greater in such stocks), leading to a more unsophisticated clientele and hence more blurred levels of compensation and excessive compensation packages.
Empirical Tests
Basic Regressions
One of our main arguments is that there should be more cases of obfuscated compensation in firms that are more actively traded (more liquid) and more complex. Since not all cases of obscured compensation are detected, the theory is inherently difficult to test. However, our theoretical results suggest that the characteristics of the firm may play a role in executive compensation. Specifically, our analysis predicts that executive compensation is positively related to trading activity, volatility, and proxies for firm complexity. The theory also implies that indirect compensation would be positively related to the extent of small investor trading.
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Our goal in this section is not to perform a full-fledged empirical analysis, but to provide some rudimentary evidence that sheds light on our theoretical model. We focus on fiscal year 2005, the most recent year for which we could obtain compensation data (results from additional years of data are discussed in the next subsection). We also restrict ourselves to NYSE/AMEX stocks for two reasons. First, as will be seen, our variables require voluminous transactions data, and this restriction keeps our exercise manageable. Second, we wish to exclude very small Nasdaq stocks with possibly errorprone compensation and trade data. Because our phenomena are likely to be less strong in stocks listed on NYSE/AMEX, owing to the fact that listing on these exchanges is subject to more stringent disclosure requirements, this restriction works against the likelihood of finding support for our hypotheses.
Compensation and shareholding data are from the executive compensation (Execucomp) database on Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). These data are collected from each company's annual proxy, which must be filed 120 days after each company's fiscal year end. Execucomp collects data for up to 9 executives per firm for a given year, 34 Indirect compensation can be viewed as ancillary parts of remuneration such as long-term incentive payouts, severance payments, payment for unused vacation, tax reimbursements, 401K contributions, life insurance premiums, and so on. We define this term precisely later in this section.
though over 80% of companies in our sample report data for only 5. As the dependent variable in our first set of regressions, we use the logarithm of each firm's average total current compensation across executives. Total compensation (reported in thousands of dollars) is comprised of salary, bonus, and all other compensation including option grants. Our regressors are at the firm level so we choose to have firm-level averages rather than executive-level data. Because the average compensation is likely to be lower in firms with more executives (i.e., additional executives are probably paid less than the top five), we use two versions of the dependent variable; the first averages data for the top five executives (ranked by total current compensation), while the second averages data across all executives whose compensation levels are reported by Execucomp.
The controls are as follows. We include log total annual dollar volume (in billions of dollars) as a measure of liquidity.
35 As proxies for a variable that is likely to attract individual investor interest, we use the standard deviation and skewness of daily returns over the year (Kumar, 2006) . We capture firm complexity by the number of business The total sample consists of 927 firms. Table 2 presents summary statistics associated with our variables. We retain in our sample those firms that report data for at least five executives. The compensation and volume variables show considerable skewness (the mean is in each case is quite different from the median), justifying the use of logarithmic 35 Using share turnover makes no material difference to our results. 36 We used alternative proxies for the link to an incentive mechanism, such as sales and net income growth over the past two years, but found that these did not perform materially better than the return variable. We also used CEO tenure as an explanatory control for compensation but found that this variable was insignificant. Finally, we used the book value of assets in place of market capitalization, but the latter variable was more important in the regressions. These results are available upon request.
transformations for these variables.
In Table 3 we report the results from the cross-sectional regression of total executive compensation on volume and measures of firm complexity. 37 In the middle panel, we average total compensation over the top five executives (ranked by total compensation), and in the rightmost panel, we average over all executives. Within both regressions, we find that trading volume is strongly and positively related to compensation along with size, and the adjusted R 2 , just under 28%, appears healthy. Additionally, executive compensation is not significantly related to returns. While a positive relationship between executive compensation and current year return may be expected from extant literature,
we compound returns over a 3-year period, making a positive relationship less obvious.
Overall, our results lend support to the notion that executive compensation is higher for more liquid and more complex (i.e., larger) firms. 38 Consistent with Kumar (2006) , compensation is also higher for firms with greater return skewness.
While the results so far support our theoretical predictions, viz., compensation is greater in more complex and more actively traded firms, our arguments suggest more specific predictions about indirect compensation: namely, such compensation, which is more difficult to understand than total compensation, will be greater not only in stocks that have greater active participation from individual investors but also in those that attract greater interest from individuals. Thus, we employ the logarithm of indirect compensation relative to total compensation as the dependent variable. Our measure of indirect compensation consists of long-term incentive payouts (payments emanating from incentives set by management) and all other compensation, which can include severance payments, debt forgiveness, payment for unused vacation, tax reimbursements, signing 37 White-corrections for heteroskedasticity left the estimates virtually unchanged, so we report the uncorrected OLS estimates. Additionally, results are qualitatively unchanged if we use only direct compensation as the dependent variable. 38 We also tried to ascertain whether total and indirect compensation levels are significantly different in the computer/high-tech sector as defined by Fama and French (1997) (3680) (3681) (3682) (3683) (3684) (3685) (3686) (3687) (3688) (3689) 3695, and 7373) . The rationale is that high tech companies with a high emphasis on human capital for success may require stronger incentives for management. Yet, inclusion of a high tech indicator variable made no material difference to the results as the dummy coefficient was insignificant.
bonuses, 401K contributions, life insurance premiums, but excludes salary and bonus.
Results from using the indirect compensation measure as our dependent variable are presented in Table 4 . The variable corresponding to the number of business segments is of the right sign and is significant at the 5% level. While volatility is negative and significant, total volume is positive and significant at the 10% level. We note that total volume may not be the best way to capture the activities of relatively unsophisticated investors and that the relationship we uncover simply suggests that firms with more interest from any investor pay their top executives a higher salary. Thus, for a more in-depth exploration, we also account for individual investor interest by including relative volume from small orders. Following Barclay and Warner (1993) , who classify orders less than 500 shares as "small", we measure small trade volume as the dollar volume emanating from orders of 500 shares or less. The variable we use is the logistic transform of small order volume scaled by total volume. As an additional check, we include (a logistic transformation of) the proportion of a company's stock held by institutions (obtained from Standard & Poor's) as an explanatory variable.
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We find that the coefficient of small order volume is significantly positive. It may be the case that institutions split orders so our trade-size measure of "small" investors may actually pick up trades by larger traders. Thus, we also control for institutional holdings, and we find that this variable is significantly negative.
40 Consistent with our theoretical predictions, results from these regressions imply that stocks with smaller institutional holdings (and imputed greater individual holdings) have greater levels of indirect compensation relative to total compensation. One might also note that, after accounting for small order volume, indirect compensation is insignificantly related to 39 Our interpretation is that the complementary portion of institutional holdings can be attributed to individual holdings. While employee holdings may also be part of this portion, such holdings only tilt the clientele towards agents less likely to be willing or able to keep executive compensation in check, which reinforces our arguments. 40 We experimented with an alternative variable for institutional holdings. Specifically, we included a dummy variable that took on the value of unity for cases where institutional holdings exceeded 50%, on the grounds that the effectiveness of individuals would be severely limited in such cases. This variable also was negative and significant in our regressions. Later in the paper, we include a variable that corresponds to orders greater than $50,000. return volatility, mitigating the concern that an increase in volatility leads to a mechanical increase in compensation because of its effect on option value. Results for all reported Execucomp executives per firm appear in the last two columns of Table 4 , and are similar to those for the top five executives (ranked by indirect compensation). Though one could argue that executives are simply being compensated for bringing increased liquidity to their stock, Table 4 shows that indirect compensation is related to small order volume, even after controlling for total volume (or liquidity).
Some Robustness Checks
Though we find that small order volume is positively related to indirect compensation, it is possible that an increase in small trader volume (or volume in general) does not cause greater executive compensation. For example, firms in which managers are able to extract more compensation may have poorer corporate governance or more entrenched managers which may result in institutional shareholders wanting to unload their positions. Or, per Merton (1987) , individuals may select stocks of companies with high name recognition (see also Frieder and Subrahmanyam, 2005) . The CEOs of such companies may have greater salaries (and, even be well-known because of their salaries). As another possibility, the CEO may demand higher compensation in firms with a higher fraction of small investors since less support, advice, or networking benefits from institutional investors may make these firms more difficult to manage. Given such alternative interpretations of our results, we attempt to address the issue of causality. By lagging the right-hand variables, we already have allayed this concern to some extent. Nonetheless, we also perform the following two-stage least-squares estimation. In the first equation, we model indirect compensation as a function of the variables in Table 4 (rightmost column). In the second equation, we model relative small order volume as a function of all the right-hand variables in the first equation except total volume, and add indirect compensation as an explanatory variable. Then, we use the number of I/B/E/S analysts making forecasts on each company as an additional explanatory variable for small order volume, which allows us to identify the equation for indirect compensation. The economic intuition is that while analyst following may influence retail investing, it is less plausible that this variable would directly influence compensation. Results from estimation of the system appear in Table 5 . As can be seen, we obtain respective coefficients of 0.429 (t=2.89) and −0.288 (t=−4.86) on small order volume and institutional holdings, and there is no substantive change in the other coefficients. Thus, our results survive the system estimation that accounts for endogeneity.
The next concern is that we have used only the most recent year of data (2005) We use our extended sample to conduct three exercises. Initially, we consider the cross-sectional correlation between changes in the indirect compensation of the top five executives and both total and small order volume over the period 1997 to 2004 (lagging the volume variables by one year). We find statistically significant correlations of 0.088 and 0.115, respectively, supporting our premise that changes in indirect compensation are related to trading activity. Next, we perform Fama and Macbeth (1973) -style regressions analogous to the last regression in Table 4 for the period 1997 to 2004, and use Newey and West (1987) corrected t-statistics to account for serial correlation and heteroskedasticity in the residuals. 41 The average coefficient on small order volume is 0.056 (t=2.65), and that on institutional holdings is −0.076 (t=−2.46). Finally, we estimate a panel regression 41 As suggested by Newey and West (1994) , we use the lag-length L to equal the integer portion of 4 T 100 2/9 , where T is the number of time-series observations. using the Fuller and Battese (1974) Table 4 , they remain statistically significant. As more years of data become available, running regressions for multiple years would achieve more power. We leave this exercise for future research.
Following the classification of Barclay and Warner (1993) , we have defined small orders based on share quantity, rather than dollars. An alternative way of classifying small orders is by dollar volume. Thus, we follow Hvidkjaer (2007) in labeling orders as small when the dollar amount traded is less than $10,000. We re-run the regression of the last column of Table 4 using the relative small order volume calculated according to this dollar threshold. The coefficient of small order volume is 0.386 with a t-statistic of 5.21, and the institutional holdings variable remains significantly negative. Thus, the size and significance of the small order volume coefficient are strengthened using this alternative definition of small orders, lending further confidence to our results.
It is worth noting that our theoretical model focuses on the idea that unsophisticated investors (measured by traders placing small orders) are unable to detect excess compensation. Yet, because greater volume may also suggest greater dispersion of ownership, resulting in a free rider problem, our empirical results are consistent with the dual notions that small investors are unable to detect and prevent excess compensation. To explore this issue further, we note that dispersion of ownership should be represented in both large and small order volume. Thus, if ownership dispersion was the sole driver of the small order volume coefficient, the coefficient of volume from very large orders should be of the same sign as that of small order volume. But, if the lack of ability to detect
indirect compensation is what drives the small order volume coefficient, then since we would expect large, sophisticated traders to better be able to detect such compensation, large order volume should enter with a negative sign. Based on these observations, we replace small order volume with large order volume (defined as proportion of total volume greater than $50,000) in our regressions. We perform this exercise for the regression in the second-to-last column of Table 4 , and report the results in Table 6 . The coefficient of large order volume is −0.364 (t=−4.08), and the institutional holdings variable remains significantly negative (the other coefficients are qualitatively unaltered). Thus, large order volume tends to reduce indirect compensation, consistent with our thesis that small investors find it hard to detect indirect compensation.
In other unreported robustness checks, we include an accounting measure of profitability, namely return on equity, in the regressions of Tables 3 and 4 . We also include firm age (defined as the number of days since the first listing on an exchange) on the grounds that young firms would pay more indirect compensation owing to a scarcity of cash from operations to pay salaries and bonuses. These variables are insignificant and the other coefficients remain materially unaltered.
From the perspective of economic significance, a 15% rise in relative small order volume implies about a 4% increase in indirect compensation, based on the relevant coefficient in the third column of Table 4 , which seems material. Overall, the empirical results lend reasonable support to the ideas developed in our paper.
Conclusion
In this paper, we attempt to understand how investor clientele interacts with managerial compensation. In our framework, individual investors with limited sophistication have difficulty in ascertaining true executive compensation from financial disclosures. An optimal extent of camouflage in managerial compensation is obtained by consideration of the degree of investor sophistication together with regulatory penalties. We show that the greater is retail investor participation, the greater is expected executive compensation. Our empirical analysis suggests that total and indirect compensation are positively related to trading volume. Indirect compensation is negatively related to institutional holdings. These results are consistent with the postulated theoretical notion that stocks with greater liquidity and greater individual investor participation are associated with greater levels of direct and indirect compensation.
Our work implies that policies that improve access to capital markets can increase expected executive compensation because governance may pass to investors who are unable to decipher true compensation from disclosures. Greater precision of private information reduces liquidity but has a potential benefit in that it can discourage individual investors from participating in financial markets and thereby maintain a check on executive compensation. Increased penalties for fraudulent disclosures and increasing disclosure transparency can also lower expected executive compensation.
The analysis presented in this paper suggests many avenues for further investigation. 
Proof of Proposition 1:
If there is no investigation, the expected compensation is simply H. Furthermore, the right-hand side of (2) is less than H because the first term on the right-hand side, which equals 0.5p(H − L), is less than H − L. 2
Proof of Proposition 2:
We first prove (4). The informed and noise traders submit market orders to the market maker who then quotes a price contingent on the net (combined) order flow of both types of traders. The informed maximizes his trading profit,
given by
Given a linear pricing rule P =F + ζQ, where Q = x + z, his order works out to be δ/2ζ. The market maker sets prices such that E(Q(P − v)|Q) = 0, so that P = E(v|Q).
From this, we have
We thus have
The proof of part 1 of Proposition 2 follows from a simple examination of the righthand side of the condition in (5). When only the institution is the shareholder, there is no camouflage for the informed agent, so trading volume and liquidity are zero. Thus, if the individual does enter the market, then compensation drops below H and volume trivially rises from zero to a positive number. Further, liquidity (the inverse of ζ) trivially increases from zero to the expression in (4). This proves Part 2. For part 3, it suffices to note that under investigation the compensation is greater than L but smaller than H. 2
Proof of Equation (6): The informed maximizes expected profits given by E[{(F − P )x}|δ + ], where x is his chosen trade. Substituting for F and P =F + ζQ, where Q, as in the proof of (4), is the order flow, it follows that his order equals
where
Proof of Proposition 3:
The condition under which the individual investor enters is given by
The left-hand side of this expression is decreasing in v , or increasing in signal precision.
Thus, increasing precision decreases the parameter set under which the condition holds.
Again, starting from a point where v is low enough where the individual investor is present and increasing it high enough so that the individual investor exits, expected executive compensation rises. 2
Proof of Proposition 4:
If
then the individual investor does not enter when the signal noise variance is v S . If
the individual enters the financial market when the signal noise variance is v G . Now, if the individual investor does not enter the financial market, then the illiquidity parameter is infinite so that ζ −1 is zero. The expected dividend when the individual investor is not present is H − L, whereas this quantity when the individual investor is present is , and all other compensation (excluding salary and bonus), as a proportion of total compensation as the dependent variable. The explanatory variables are log total dollar volume, logistic transformation of relative small order volume (proportion of dollar volume emanating from trades of less than 500 shares), return volatility (standard deviation of daily returns) and return skewness over the year, the compounded stock return over the past thirty-six months, the number of business segments, market capitalization as of the end of the year (firm size in billions of dollars), and the logistic transform of the proportion of stock held by institutions. The middle panel reports results averaged across the top five executives (ranked by the dependent variable) within each firm. The rightmost two columns provide results averaged by firm across all executives whose compensation levels are reported in the Execucomp database. The coefficient of size is multiplied by 10 9 . The sample includes all NYSE/AMEX stocks, and the dependent variable is measured in 2005 whereas the independent variables are from the year 2004. , and all other compensation (excluding salary and bonus), as a proportion of total compensation as the dependent variable. The explanatory variables are log total dollar volume, logistic transformation of relative small order volume (proportion of dollar volume emanating from trades less than 500 shares), return volatility (standard deviation of daily returns) and return skewness over the year, the compounded stock return over the past thirty-six months, the number of business segments, market capitalization as of the end of the year (firm size in billions of dollars), and the logistic transform of the proportion of stock held by institutions. Two-stage least squares estimates are presented with relative small order volume modeled as a function of all of the determinants of indirect compensation except total volume, and the number of I/B/E/S analysts making earnings forecasts on the company included as an additional explanatory variable. This This table presents the results of individual stock indirect executive compensation using the sum of long-term incentive payouts (payments emanating from incentives set by management), and all other compensation (excluding salary and bonus), as a proportion of total compensation as the dependent variable. The explanatory variables are log total dollar volume, the logistic transformation of relative large order volume (proportion of dollar volume emanating from trades with a dollar value exceeding $50,000), return volatility (standard deviation of daily returns) and return skewness over the year, the compounded stock return over the past thirty-six months, the number of business segments, market capitalization as of the end of the year (firm size in billions of dollars), and the logistic transform of the proportion of stock held by institutions. The 
